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government pursues redistributive policies financed through distortionary taxation. With
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welfare state provision on: (1) the pattern of the country’s trade, (2) the depth of the division
of labour within the economy, and (3) the country’s welfare. We show that an increase in the
size of the welfare state might have positive effects on the country’s income and on the extent
to which the country specialises in the high-tech sector.
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11. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the effects of welfare state provision on a country’s economic
performance.
The last fifty years have witnessed a world-wide increase in the use of fiscal
redistribution. Indeed, albeit to different extents, most countries’ ascent on the industrialisation
ladder has indisputably been accompanied by an increase in the relative size of their welfare
state programmes.  However, in the 1980s and 1990s a new conventional wisdom of ‘good
governance’ has emerged which questions governments’ role in the economy. One facet of this
conventional wisdom is that ‘rolling-back the welfare state’ is an inevitable consequence of
‘globalisation’, the latter being perceived as eroding the power of governments to
independently shape their economies. ‘Successful competition’ in international markets is thus
undermined by welfare state policies that introduce rigidities in labour markets and have
distortionary effects through the taxation required to finance them.  A corollary of this view is
that labour market flexibility and reduced union power are essential to ‘successfully
competing’ in the global economy. Interestingly, this conventional wisdom partly conflicts
with some of the stylised facts emerging from the existing empirical evidence that indicate a
positive correlation between openness and the scope of government (e.g. Cameron, 1978;
Rodrik, 1996) and between openness, union size and degree of wage setting centralisation
(e.g. Cameron, 1978; Agell, 1999).
Unfortunately, despite the attention they have attracted in policy debates, the academic
literature has hardly dealt with the relationship between economic integration and the welfare
state1. In the theoretical literature that has recently started to emerge, three main approaches
can be identified. The first focuses on the distortionary effects of public expenditure and
taxation. Alesina and Perotti (1997) find that, in the presence of labour unions, welfare
expenditure financed through labour income taxation has negative effects on competitiveness –
measured by relative unit labour cost – because unions transfer the burden of taxation on to
firms through higher wages. A second argument rests on the effects of openness on a
country’s exposure to risk. On the one hand, by increasing the potential for risk diversification
(particularly in financial assets) openness reduces the overall exposure to risk. On the other
hand, because of a higher specialisation of production, international integration will increase
the exposure to foreign shocks. Whilst Wildasin (1995), within a static partial equilibrium
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  For a general discussion of these issues see Atkinson (1997).
2model, finds that international integration reduces the need for social insurance, Rodrik (1997,
1998) argues that, by increasing volatility, openness enhances the need for social insurance. In
support of this conclusion Rodrik presents empirical evidence that more open economies have
larger public sectors which act as risk insurers. Andersen (2000) develops an inter-temporal
general equilibrium two-country model of international trade that reconciles the two
arguments above. On the one hand the model supports the view that integration increases the
distortionary effects of public sector activities, thus calling for a reduction of the welfare state.
On the other, it shows how higher degrees of integration may increase volatility thus requiring
a rise in the provision of social insurance. The third approach is developed within the closed-
economy endogenous growth framework and focuses on the effects of social transfers on the
level of economic efficiency. Sala-i-Martin (1996) argues that transfers can have a positive
effect on the average stock of human capital, effectively by buying the elderly out of the
workforce, thus leading to increases in output per capita. Marini and Scaramozzino (2000)
show how the introduction of an unfunded balanced-budget pension scheme can lead to
permanently higher capital and output in the presence of learning-by-doing dynamics stemming
from capital accumulation.
We intend to contribute to the assessment of these issues by highlighting a different
mechanism through which welfare state policies interact with openness in affecting a country’s
economic performance. The central idea of this paper is that social security programmes may
lead to higher levels of economic efficiency by improving the exploitation of potential
aggregate economies of scale. The importance of the latter has been formalised by the
endogenous growth literature and the fact that positive externalities may arise for the whole
economy from producing in certain sectors has been informing government policies around the
world2. Despite this, the theoretical underpinnings of the typical arguments levied against the
welfare state do not allow for the effects of these externalities. However, any meaningful
debate about the sustainability of welfare state programmes has to be based on analytical
frameworks that recognise the importance of these externalities because they affect – in a
rather complex and therefore not easily predictable fashions – the way in which economic
policy impacts on the economy’s performance.  We shall therefore set up a framework within
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  In the UK, the importance of specialisation in knowledge based (fast growing demand) activities (DTI, 1998)
capable of generating externalities for the economy as a whole is a cornerstone of the current policy
framework.
3which the role of economy-wide externalities in determining the relationship between welfare
state and competitiveness can be captured.
Although its precise definition, nature, extent and consequences still remain a matter of
contention, globalisation is typically meant to refer to the process through which national
economies become more open, and is implicitly purported as reducing the economic size of
countries and their monopoly power in world markets3. Hence, a small open economy
assumption seems to be a plausible and analytically valuable starting point to analyse the
effects of welfare state policies on economic performance. Of the many dimensions of
‘globalisation’, we shall concentrate on free-trade in final goods markets and rule out factor
mobility4. Furthermore, given that the social and political costs of rolling back the welfare
state are likely to be more significant in industrialised countries where welfare states are larger,
we choose to focus the analysis on an industrial economy. Therefore, the model set-up will be
based on a number of assumptions meant to characterise such an economy. First, the country’s
government pursues redistributive policies financed through distortionary taxation. Second,
labour markets are unionised with unemployment emerging in equilibrium. With unionisation,
income redistribution policies financed by labour income taxes will affect firms’ costs since the
unions will transfer part of the burden of taxation to employers via higher wages. Given that
the degree of distortion generated by unionisation is known to depend on the degree of
coordination of unions’ decisions (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Summer, Gruber and
Vergara, 1993; Rama, 1994), we allow for different degrees of wage setting centralisation.
The final crucial feature of the model concerns the source of the aggregate economies of scale.
It is now widely accepted that a typical implication of industrial development is the increasing
‘indirectness’ of production processes, with final goods sectors relying more and more on
highly specialised intermediate inputs. We shall therefore assume an input-output structure
with vertical linkages between an intermediate and two final goods (one high-tech and one
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  According to Alesina and Spolaore (1997), the physical size of countries is also to an extent endogenous to
the process of economic integration. The latter, by reducing the constraints to market size posed by a
country’s political boundaries, may lead to political fragmentation thus allowing countries to reduce the cost
of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity.
4
  To a great extent, capital mobility is at the core of the debate about the compatibility of welfare states with
international integration. It should, however, be noted that social security activities are primarily financed by
income taxes and do not rest significantly on capital taxation (e.g. in the EU on average capital taxation only
accounts for 7.5% of public sector revenue). Hence, the argument that capital mobility, by shrinking the tax
base, poses further threats to the welfare state may not be so crucial. Allowing for international capital
mobility does not substantially alter the main results of this paper (see Molana and Montagna, 2000).
4low-tech) sectors5. The increasing returns to scale stemming from this input-output structure
give rise to a ‘circularity’ between range of intermediates, economy-wide efficiency and
pattern of specialisation in production and trade. Thus, to the extent that government policies
affect market structure, they will also impact on the availability of intermediates, on their
aggregate productivity and on the economy’s trade performance.
Within this framework, we shall examine the effects of social insurance policies (in the
form of unemployment benefits) and of different labour market institutional settings on a
country’s economic performance. The latter is defined as a country’s ability to maintain or
expand its present level of income, to deepen its division of labour and improve its degree of
specialisation in high-tech sectors.
In general, our findings suggest that in a price-taking economy characterised by
complementarities in production, an increase in the size of the welfare state can have positive
effects on the country’s real income and on the extent to which it specialises in the high-tech
sector.  As in Alesina and Perotti (1997), larger welfare states do lead to higher distortions,
particularly at intermediate levels of wage setting centralisation (when unions are strong
enough to reap substantial rents but not large enough to take account of the links between
their actions and the government budget constraint). Contrary to Alesina and Perotti,
however, our results point to the fact that larger welfare states do not have unambiguously
negative effects on a country’s ‘competitiveness’ and that the ‘disruption’ of higher wages
may instead positively affect the overall performance of an economy. This is because, in the
presence of vertical linkages between sectors, higher wages in the intermediate sector could
result in a higher demand for intermediates. In these circumstances, those factors responsible
for a higher wage, such as a more generous welfare state and/or an increase in unions’
monopoly power, will lead to a deepening in the division of labour and to an increase in the
degree of specialisation in the high-tech sector.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3
derives the general equilibrium, Section 4 carries out the policy analysis and  Section 5 draws
some conclusions.
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  The existing empirical evidence reveals important inter-industry connections leading to external returns to
scale in manufacturing (e.g. Caballero and Lyons, 1992; Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons, 1994). At a
theoretical level, the importance of vertical linkages as a major source of economy-wide increasing returns to
scale has been widely acknowledged. See among others: Eithier (1982), Matzuyama (1995), Okuno-Fujiwara
(1988), Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Rodrik (1996), Venables (1996).
52. THE MODEL
We consider a small open economy consisting of an upstream intermediate goods sector and
of two downstream final good industries. The downstream industries produce two final goods
( 1Y  and 2Y ) which are homogeneous and are freely traded in world markets. The upstream
industry produces an intermediate good (X) that comes in a continuum of varieties. This good
can be thought of as consisting of highly specialised producer services and other intangible
inputs such as knowledge. As all other production factors, these intermediate varieties are
assumed to be non-traded6.
2.1. Consumers
The representative individual has the homothetic utility function
V~)1()1(
YYU 1
1
21 ξ
µµ µµ
µµ
−+
−
=
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−
,                      (1)
which can be taken to represent the aggregate preferences of the consumer sector. In (1), hY
(h=1,2) are consumption of the final goods. The representative individual is assumed to be
endowed with one unit of labour, supplied inelastically. The individual is employed if 1=ξ
and unemployed if 0=ξ . V~ is the  utility of leisure. Constrained optimisation of (1) yields the
demand functions
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  The non-tradability of intermediates is frequently assumed in the literature to capture the importance of
proximity of the intermediate sector to final good industries (e.g. Rodriguez-Clare, 1996, and Rodrik, 1996).
As we argue in the conclusions, however, a natural extension of this paper will be to relax this assumption,
given that the empirical evidence suggests that trade in intermediates is increasing. Note, however, that in
the presence of inter-sectoral linkages, the non-tradability of intermediates does not imply that upstream
sector producers are shielded from international competition.
6where hP  (h=1,2) are the prices of the two goods and M  is nominal disposable income (to be
defined later).
2.2.  Production sector
There are three primary inputs in the economy which we call labour (L), capital (K) and land
(Z), whose rates of return are respectively denoted by w, r and q. The intermediate good
comes in a continuum of horizontally differentiated varieties and is produced in the upstream
sector by a mass of firms which is endogenously determined by free-entry and exit in response
to profit opportunities. The intermediate varieties are produced with a fixed requirement in
terms of capital (γ) and a variable per-unit labour input requirement (δ). The resulting
decreasing average cost technology generates an incentive for specialisation leading to a one-
to-one correspondence between the mass of firms and that of available varieties. Thus, the
labour requirement of a typical firm i is  ii xl δ=  and its profit will be given by
γδπ rxwxp iiiii −−= ,          (3)
where ix  and ip  are the firm’s output and price and iw  is the wage it pays its workforce.
The intermediate varieties are used in the production of the final goods by the
downstream industries and are assembled into a composite input according to a CES
technology.  The price index for the differentiated varieties is
σ
σ
−
∈
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= ∫ 1
1
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1
ix dipP ,            (4)
where  N is the mass of firms in the industry and σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties, which implies that no single variety is an essential input. A well known implication of
this technology is that the productivity of the intermediate input is increasing in the range of
available varieties. Hence, entry of new firms, by introducing new varieties of specialised
inputs, will generate increasing returns at the aggregate level, thus enhancing the production
efficiency of the final good sectors.
The downstream industries produce the two homogenous consumer goods 1Y  and 2Y
7which we call ‘high’ and ‘low-tech’ respectively and which are freely traded in world markets.
Labour is not directly required as a primary factor in the production of either good. Instead,
both commodities are produced using a basket of the intermediate varieties and the two other
primary factors. For a given set of intermediate inputs, both final goods are produced with a
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology ( ) hhhhhh hhhhhhh XZKY λβαλβα λβα −−−=   (h=1,2),
where 10 h << α , 10 h << β  and hhh 1 βαλ −−= . We shall assume that the intermediates
are used most intensively in the production of the high-tech good 1Y  (i.e. 21 λλ > ) and that
factor K is used most intensively in the production of the low-tech good 2Y  (i.e. 21 αα < ).
Thus, X and K are the ‘extreme’ factors and Z is the ‘middle’ one.  We do not at this stage
impose any restriction on the relative size of 1β  and 2β . Given this production function, the
minimum total cost of producing Yh, in the two final goods sectors, is
( )hhh xhh PqrYC λβα= ,           (5)
Since the downstream industries are perfectly competitive, they produce where price equals
average cost. The small open economy assumption implies that the two final good prices hP
are determined in the world market. From (5) we obtain
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that give the amount the two industries are respectively willing to pay for the intermediate
input in terms of their own output price and the return to the other factors. Given (6) the two
industries demands for the intermediates, land and capital are respectively given by
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For convenience, we use the low-tech good as the numeraire and set 1P2 =  in the following
analysis.
Finally, given (4), we apply Sheppard’s Lemma to (5) to obtain a system of demand
equations for the varieties of the differentiated good by the final good sectors,
( ) σ−

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1i P
pXXx .                       (8)
2.3. Factor markets
The markets for capital and land are perfectly competitive with resource constraints
respectively given by
d
2
d
1 ZZZ += ,           (9)
and
d
x
d
2
d
1 KKKK ++= ,          (10)
where NK dx γ=  is the intermediate sector’s demand for capital.
 The labour market in the intermediate sector is unionised (this aspect of the model is
identical to Alesina and Perotti, 1997. See also Rama, 1994). For simplicity we assume that
unions have monopoly over wages with equilibrium employment being determined by firms.
As in Alesina and Perotti (1997), we assume that there is a mass J of unions whose
membership is symmetric. Thus, a typical union will have a mass of members J/LL j = ,
9[ ]J,1j ∈ , where L  is the total labour endowment of the country, and will set wages for a
mass of firms N/J. Clearly, given the assumed symmetry between firms, the union will set the
same wage for all the firms it covers. Note that J gives an inverse measure of the degree of
centralisation in the wage setting process, with smaller values of J corresponding to higher
degrees of centralisation and with the typical union setting the wage for a larger mass of firms.
Unionisation will result in equilibrium unemployment. Thus, given the symmetry between
unions, each unions will have some unemployed members.
The objective function of a typical union j can be obtained from (1) and is given by the
expected utility of its typical member
V~
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=
τ
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where jL  is the mass of union j’s members who are employed, τ and b are respectively the
labour income tax rate and the unemployment benefit set by the government and µµ −= 121 PPP
is the consumer price index. Note that we are assuming that unemployment benefits are not
taxed and b is considered as net transfer.
Given the symmetry between the firms covered by a union, a typical union j will face a
labour demand of ij lJ
NL = .  Thus, total industry demand for labour will be given by
ij lNJLL == .          (12)
Hence, the labour market resource constraint is given by LL ≤ .
2.4. Government sector
The government is a provider of welfare protection in the form of unemployment benefits,
financed through factor income taxation. The government budget constraint is therefore given
by
( ) ( ) ( )ZqKrJLw)JLL(b jjj φρτ ++=− ,          (13)
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where ρ  and φ are the tax rates on capital and land incomes and jw  is the wage rate set by
each union j.
2.5. Foreign sector
Finally, the trade balance equation that closes the model is
0)YY(P)YY(P d2S22d1S11 =−+− .          (14)
which, given the definition of income M provided below, is implied by the other market
equilibrium conditions and the government budget constraint described above.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
Given equations (3) and (8), the optimal price rule for a typical firm i covered by union j will
be given by jji w1
p δ
σ
σ
−
= . Clearly, since all firms have the same variable input requirement
δ and given that each firm covered by the same union faces the same wage, it follows that
jji pp = , ∀ i.  Adopting, for simplicity, the normalisation δσ
σ
=
− 1
, firms’ optimal price
setting rule can be written as
jj wp = .          (15)
In the free-entry equilibrium, each firm will break-even. Setting (3) equal to zero and
using (15) we obtain
j
j
w
r
xx γσ== ,          (16)
which gives the optimal output scale of a typical firm belonging to union j. Due to the use of
capital as a fixed input requirement, (16) depends on relative factor prices. However, for any
given w and r, the optimal output scale is constant and equal for all firms. Hence, the size of
11
the market affects neither the mark-up over marginal cost nor the scale at which individual
varieties are produced, with the extent to which each firm exploits internal increasing returns
to scale depending only on the elasticity of substitution between varieties7.
It will prove useful to note that given (15) and (16), the CES quantity index dual to (4)
implies the industry zero profit condition,
N
P
rX
x
γσ= .            (17)
Equilibrium wages are determined by the monopoly unions. Two scenarios can be
envisaged. In the first, unions are assumed to be small enough (i.e. J is large enough) for each
union not to internalise the government budget constraint. In the second scenario, unions are
large enough to internalise the link between taxation paid by their members and the
unemployment benefits they receive.
When unions are not strong enough to internalise the negative effects of their actions, a
typical union j will maximise (11) to find the optimal wage
)11)(1(
)V~Pb(
w
j
j
ε
τ −−
+
= ,          (18)
where 
j
j
j
j
j L
w
dw
dL
−=ε  is the wage elasticity of demand for labour facing union j. A ceteris
paribus increase in τ, by reducing the after tax wage, induces the unions to bid up the nominal
wage. An increase in b  (which, together with V~ , can be seen to represent the reservation
wage) increases union members’ alternative utility and thus induces the unions to increase their
wage demands. The union’s mark-up on the reservation wage is inversely related to jε , that is
as the elasticity of its labour demand with respect to wage falls, the union’s monopoly power
increases.  It is straightforward to show that (see Appendix A1)
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Since 0
dJ
d j
>
ε
, as J increases and unions become smaller, their mark-up falls and they reap
smaller rents.
When the institutional bargaining framework is very centralised, as in ‘corporatist’
economies, unions’ internalisation of the government budget constraint will lead to lower
wage demands. In this case, unions will maximise the following objective function, which is
obtained by combining (11) and the government budget constraint in (13),
( ) 
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 to obtain the optimal wage
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= ,        (18 
which is independent of the income tax and of the unemployment benefit rates8 and is
unambiguously lower than that in (18).
Clearly, the fact that both unions and firms are symmetric implies that, under both
wage setting regimes, ww j =  ∀j, that is all employed workers will receive the same wage in
equilibrium.  As a result, the government budget constraint in (13) can be re-written as
( ) ( ) ( )qZrKwL)LL(b φρτ ++=− .
Finally, given (16), (12) can be re-written as
 ( ) N
w
r1L −= σγ ,          (20)
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which, together with (17) and the normalisation 
σ
σδ 1−= , implies XPwL xδ= .
3.1. Circular causation, intermediate wages, welfare and trade pattern
Denoting a relative change by a hat (^) over a variable, we proceed by writing the structural
equations of the model developed above in terms of proportional changes.
Totally differentiating (6) and solving for changes in q and r we obtain9
,Pˆrˆ
,Pˆqˆ
xr
xq
θ
θ
=
−=
            (21)
where 
2112
2112
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λαλαθ
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=   and  
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−
= . From (4) and given (15), we obtain
wˆNˆ
1
1Pˆx +
−
=
σ
,            (22)
and the zero profit condition in (17) yields
rˆNˆXˆPˆx +=+ .            (23)
Manipulating the factor demand equations in (7) and the resource constraints in (9) and (10)
we obtain
( )XˆPˆ)a1(qˆarˆ x +−+= ,            (24)
where 
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 (see Appendix A3).
Equations (21)-(24) can be solved to eliminate xPˆ,qˆ,rˆ  and Xˆ  to obtain the following
relationship between relative changes in the intermediate sector wage and mass of firms:
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It is tedious but straightforward to show that a sufficient condition for the expression in
brackets on the (25) to be positive is
Condition 1: (1.a)  
2
1
2
1
2
1 1
λ
λ
β
β
α
α
<<< ,  and
(1.b)  
2112
121 βαβα
ββ
σ
−
−
+< .
In addition to what was originally assumed, Condition (1.a) implies that the ‘middle’ factor Z
is used more intensively in the low-tech sector. This sector is therefore relatively intensive in
both primary factors. Condition (1.b) requires the elasticity of substitution between the
intermediate varieties to be “not too large”10. Given the positive relationship between the price
index in (4) and σ, this is equivalent to requiring sufficiently strong aggregate economies of
scale. It is useful to note that (1.a) implies that 0q >θ , 1r >θ  and a>0, and (1.b) is equivalent
to 
r
θσ <  and also implies a<1. Hence, under these conditions 0<a<1. Thus, when these two
restrictions hold, an increase in the intermediate sector’s wage results in a wider range of
intermediate varieties being produced11. Before proceeding it is worth to clarify further the
role of these restrictions. Even a casual observation of real world industries suggests that
condition (1.a) is highly plausible. It may indeed be fairly common for high-tech sectors to be
intensive in highly specialised knowledge-based inputs but to use relatively less intensively
other factors such as physical capital and land.  Hence, the restriction in (1.a) could be
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 Note that this is not too restrictive and σ>2 can be obtained as long as 1)/()( 211212 >−− βαβαββ  which is
satisfied if )1/()1()/()/( 121212 ααββαα ++>> .
11
 Clearly we could have assumed that X and Z are the ‘extreme’ factors and K is the ‘middle’ factor. In this
case, Condition 1 would be 1.a) )/(1)/()/( 212121 λλααββ <<< , and 1.b) σ < σ* where σ* is derived by
imposing the positivity condition on the right-hand-side of (25). Also note, that an equivalent condition can
be obtained in the case (available on request from the authors) in which the fixed cost in the monopolistically
competitive sector is in terms of labour. In both the cases discussed in this footnote, the qualitative
conclusions of this section would not be altered.
15
imposed from the start as a plausible assumption, in which case Condition (1.b) alone would
be sufficient for dN/dw>0.
In order to be able to analyse the effects of policy changes and labour market shocks
on the general equilibrium of the model, we shall need to determine the effect of wage changes
on the country’s income and on the trade balance.
Total income is given by ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LLbZq1Kr1wL1M −+−+−+−= φρτ  and provides
a measure of the country’s welfare. Using the government budget constraint
( ) ( ) ( )qZrKwL)LL(b φρτ ++=−  and recalling that XPwL xδ= , it can be re-written as
ZqKrXPM x ++= δ , which implies
( ) qˆ
M
Zq
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M
KrXˆPˆ
M
XP
Mˆ x
x 
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
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
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

=
δ
.           (26)
Substituting from (21)-(24), it is straightforward to show that Condition 1 is sufficient for
0
dN
dM
>  (see Appendix A4). Hence, given that 
dw
dN
dN
dM
dw
dM
= , it follows that Conditions 1 is
sufficient to ensure that higher wage rates result in an increase in the country’s income.
The excess supply of the high-tech good is d1
s
1
e
1 YYY −=  which, upon substitution for
the right-hand-side components, yields




−







+
−
−







−
−
=
112112
2
1
x
2112
2e
1 P
Kr
P
Zq
P
XP
Y µµλβλβ
λµδλβλβ
β
.            (27)
Equation (27) can be totally differentiated to derive  (see Appendix A5)
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Hence,
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Condition 2:      0
dN
dY e1 >   if  Condition 1 holds and ))(a1(
a0
2112
2
λβλβ
λµ
−−
<< .
Given that 
dw
dN
dN
dY
dw
dY e1
e
1
= , it follows that Conditions 1 and 2 are sufficient to ensure that
increases in the wage rate result in a pattern of specialisation which is more biased towards the
high-tech good.
Thus, these results imply that there are circumstances in which an increase in the wage
paid to the intermediate sector’s workers will lead to a rise in: (i) the range of intermediate
varieties 


> 0
dw
dN
;  (ii) the country’s welfare 


> 0
dw
dM
; and (iii) the degree of
specialisation in the high-tech sector 



> 0
dw
dY e1
.
To highlight the intuition behind these results, it is useful to start by holding the mass
of firms in the intermediate sector constant. For any given N, an increase in wage will have
two immediate effects on the economy. First, it will ceteris paribus increase income and the
demand for both final goods, with no effect on the relative demand for factors. Second, the
higher wage will result in an increase in each firm’s price and in the industry price index. With
the other factor prices and all factor endowments held constant, this will change the relative
demand for factors and result in adjustments in final goods outputs. In the first instance, as the
intermediate good becomes more expensive, there will be a substitution in both final good
sectors towards capital and land and an overall shift of resources towards the low-tech good
will follow. This, however, will not be the end of the adjustment process since, when the
number of factors exceeds the number of commodities, shocks to factor markets will generate
changes in the output mix that will clear only as many factor markets as there are outputs (see
Jones and Easton, 1983). Thus, if outputs adjust to clear markets for the extreme factors,
excess supply or demand for the middle factor will result; it is straightforward to show that
under Condition 1.a., the market for factor Z will be in an excess demand situation. This will
lead to subsequent adjustments to the other factors’ demands. At constant N, the demand for
the differentiated input will increase, resulting in the entry of new firms in the upstream
intermediate sector. This will, in turn, activate two main forces.
First, the increase in N will put pressure on the relative cost of capital, since the entry
of new firms will decrease the capital stock available for final goods production, i.e.
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( γNK − ). As a result, the relative cost of the good which uses capital less intensively (that is
the high-tech good) will fall, thus increasing the relative demand for and supply of this good.
Second, the wider range of available varieties will result in a higher productivity of the
intermediate good which will benefit the production of both final goods. However, the cost of
production of the high-tech good will decline relatively more since this good uses the
intermediate input more intensively. Thus, these two forces will lead to an increase in
production and export of the high-tech relative to the low-tech good and induce a process of
circular causation of rising demand for intermediates and entry of new firms into the upstream
sector12.
An interesting special case of this model is the ‘specific-factor’ model13, where one
factor is mobile between sectors and each of the other factors is used specifically by one of the
sectors. In our case, the ‘middle’ factor Z would be the mobile factor, while X and K would
only be used in sector one and two respectively (i.e. 01 =α  and 02 =λ ). A sufficient
condition for 0
dw
dN
>  would then be  (a) 1
2
1 <β
β
, and (b) ( )21
12
1
1 ββ
ββ
σ
−
−
+< . Thus, even in
this case, circumstances will exist where an increase in the intermediate sector wage will lead
to a virtuous circle of entry and specialisation in the high-tech sector.
4.  UNIONS’ POWER, WELFARE STATE POLICIES AND SPECIALISATION
In this section we shall analyse the effects of different policies on the country’s pattern of
international specialisation and level of income. Our main focus in this paper is on how welfare
state redistributive policies affect a country’s economic performance in the presence of
different labour market institutional arrangements. To this end, we shall consider (i) a policy
shock, in the form of changes in the rate of unemployment benefits; and (ii) a shock to the
institutional setting of the labour market, in the form of a change in the degree of centralisation
of the wage setting process (i.e. changes in the mass – and hence monopoly power – of
unions). Both of these shocks will have implications for the government budget constraint.
                                                       
12
 The assumption that the fixed cost in the intermediate sector is in terms of capital does strengthen this
process of circular causation but is not crucial to it. Hence, the conclusions of this section would not be
qualitatively altered by assuming that the fixed cost was in terms of labour, instead.
13
 See for instance Jones (1971) and Neary (1978).
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The issue therefore arises as to what will their overall effects be when different tax instruments
are used to offset them.
As discussed in the previous section, the degree of centralisation of the wage setting
process plays an important role in determining the nature of the policy effects. We shall
therefore distinguish between the cases in which the unions internalise and do not internalise
the effects of their actions on taxation.
4.1. Unions do not internalise the government budget constraint
When unions are small enough for each not to internalise the link between taxation and
unemployment benefit, the wage rate set by each union j is given by equation (18).
Exploiting the symmetry between unions, the optimal wage rule in equation (18) in  the
non-internalisation case (denoted by superscript NI) can be written as
( ) V~Pbw111NI =−−


−= τ
ε
Ω , which upon total differentiation yields (see Appendix A6)
 0dbdJddw ’NIb
’NI
J
’NI’NI
w =+++ ΩΩτΩΩ τ .          (29)
Totally differentiating the government budget constraint in (13) and rearranging terms yields
(see Appendix A7)
 0dbGdGdGdGdwG ’b’’’*w =++++ φρτ φρτ .          (30)
The government can offset the budgetary consequences of an exogenous change in the mass of
unions, while maintaining a given level of benefit rate, by changing any of the tax instruments.
If Condition 1 holds, (29) and (30) imply14
                                                       
14
 Equations (31) and (32) below give dw/dJ and dw/db as solutions obtained from equations (29) and (30)
when db and dJ are set to zero respectively and only the relevant tax instrument is allowed to adjust. See
Appendix A7 for determining the signs of the derivatives in (31) and (32).
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Clearly, regardless of the way the shock is offset, an increase in the number of unions will
reduce the equilibrium wage.
It is also interesting to analyse the effects on the equilibrium wage of changes in
unemployment benefit, financed through the different tax instruments.  From equations (29)
and (30), when Condition 1 holds, we obtain  (see Appendix A7)
  









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’NI
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0d,0d0d,0d
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τ
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Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω
         (32)
The tax instrument used does not affect the nature of the effect of a change in the
unemployment benefit rate on the equilibrium wage. Thus
Proposition 1: Regardless of the tax instrument used to offset the effects of the shock on the
government budget constraint, Condition 1 is sufficient for both (i) a
reduction in the mass of unions (i.e. an increase in unions’ monopoly power),
and (ii) a rise in unemployment benefit to result in an increase in the upstream
sector’s general equilibrium wage.
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Using the above results we can examine how these shocks affect the country’s
disposable income and pattern of export. Given (26) and (28), (31) and (32) imply the
following







<=
<=
,0
dJ
dw
dw
dN
dN
dY
dJ
dY
,0
dJ
dw
dw
dN
dN
dM
dJ
dM
e
1
e
1
         (33)
and







>=
>=
.0
db
dw
dw
dN
dN
dY
db
dY
,0
db
dw
dw
dN
dN
dM
db
dM
e
1
e
1
         (34)
Thus:
Proposition 2: Regardless of the tax instrument used to offset the effects of a shock on the
government budget constraint, Condition 1 is sufficient for both (i) a
reduction in the mass of unions (i.e. an increase in unions’ monopoly power),
and (ii) a rise in unemployment benefit to result in an increase in the country’s
income and in the extent to which it specialises in the high-tech good.
Finally, it is interesting to analyse the effects on total labour demand of changes in the
institutional arrangements in the labour market and of the welfare provision. From equations
(12) we obtain
dw
dl
N
dw
dNl
dw
dL i
i += ,          (35)
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It can be shown that 0
dw
dL
>  for all σ≥2 (see Appendix A8). Since 0
dw
dli < , this clearly implies
that the effect of an increase in wage on entry dominates in most cases its negative effect on
firms’ labour demand. Thus:
Proposition 3: When Condition 1 holds, those factors (e.g. an increase in unemployment
benefits or a rise in the monopoly power of unions) which have a positive
impact on the equilibrium wage in the upstream industry are also likely to
lead to an overall decrease in unemployment.
The results outlined in Propositions 1-3 cast doubts on the general validity of the
conventional wisdom outlined in the introduction. Depending on the nature of final goods
technology, in the presence of vertical linkages between sectors an increase in unemployment
benefit rate and/or an increase in union power may – by increasing the intermediate sector
wage – lead to an increase in disposable income and may intensify the specialisation of
production and trade in the high-tech sector15. In the next subsection we shall examine the
case of a centralised wage setting process.
4.2. Unions internalise the government budget constraint
When unions are large enough to internalise the link between taxation and unemployment
benefit (denoted by superscript I), the wage rate set by each union j is given by equation (18 
which can be rewritten as V~Pw11I =


−=
ε
Ω . Upon total differentiation, this yields (see
Appendix A9)
0dJdw ’IJ
’I
w =+ ΩΩ .          (36)
As already mentioned, in this case changes in taxation and unemployment benefits do not
affect the wage and labour cost. From (36), we obtain
                                                       
15
 Under the conditions discussed in Section 3.1, these results also hold in the specific-factor case.
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  0
dJ
dw
’I
w
’I
J <−=
Ω
Ω
 .          (37)
Proposition 4: When unions internalise the government budget constraint: (1) changes in the
degree of social protection do not have any effect on the equilibrium wage,
regardless of the tax instrument used to offset them; and (2) Condition 1 is
sufficient for a reduction in the mass of unions (i.e. a rise in unions’ monopoly
power) to result in an increase in the upstream sector’s general equilibrium
wage.
Given (26) and (28), (37) implies that the effects of a change in J on M and e1Y  are
qualitatively identical to that in (33), whereas a change in b does not have any effect on the
former variables since the unions’ wage is independent of the unemployment benefit, hence







=
=
.0
db
dY
,0
db
dM
e
1
         (38)
Thus:
Proposition 5:  With highly centralised unions, regardless of the tax instrument used to offset
the effects of the shock on the government budget constraint, (1) Condition 1
is sufficient for a reduction in the mass of unions (i.e. a rise in unions’
monopoly power) to result in an increase in the country’s income and in the
extent to which it specialises in the high-tech good; and (2) an increase in
unemployment benefit will have no effect on income and trade pattern.
5. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined the role of economy-wide increasing returns to scale in
shaping the relationship between welfare state policies and economic performance in a world
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with free-trade in final goods. We develop a model of a small open economy characterised by
unionised labour markets and vertical linkages between two downstream final good sectors
and an upstream sector producing highly specialised intermediate inputs. The main finding of
the paper is that plausible circumstances exist in which proactive welfare state policies have a
positive impact on the depth of the division of labour, on national welfare and on the extent of
specialisation on high-tech sectors which intensively utilise highly specialised intermediate
inputs.
Through their monopoly power, unions will shift the burden of income taxation on to
the wage and labour costs. In recent years a widespread consensus has emerged in the
literature16 about the fact that – in so doing – unions may be most disruptive at intermediate
levels of centralisation, that is when they are strong enough to reap substantial rents but not
large enough to take account of the links between their actions and the government budget
constraint. Our analysis is consistent with the hump-shaped relationship between the degree of
distortion of fiscal policy and the levels of centralisation of labour markets highlighted by
Alesina and Perotti (1997): higher degrees of centralisation lead to higher wages – up to when
unions are large enough to internalise the government budget constraint, at which point
increases in taxation will lead to smaller increases in wages than at low levels of centralisation.
Hence, in the presence of unionisation, larger welfare states – by implying higher taxation –
would normally lead to higher distortions. However, our results point to the possibility that the
‘disruption’ of higher wages may not always have negative implications for the overall
performance of an economy. This is because the input-output structure of the economy could
be such that higher wages in the intermediate sector may lead to a higher demand for
intermediates, thus generating a virtuous circle of entry, higher welfare and greater
specialisation in high-tech sectors.
These results have two major implications. First, strong but not very centralised
unions, with a high degree of shifting of taxation, may have a positive impact on the country’s
level of wages, income, and specialisation in high-tech sectors. It follows that in the presence
of openness, corporatist countries with highly centralised labour markets may exploit less the
potential economy-wide increasing returns stemming form vertical linkages in production and
may therefore be less specialised in high-tech goods. Second, the benefits of the welfare state
                                                       
16
 See for instance Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993), and Rama (1994).
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are higher if it is financed through labour income taxes that, because of their stronger impact
on wages, will enhance the strength of the virtuous circle.
Caution should be used when drawing policy conclusions in the presence of
complementarities whose nature is highly sensitive to changes in environment. Our aim here
was not to obtain generally valid results about the interaction between welfare state policies
and economic performance for open economies. Instead, we wanted to stress that when more
complex economic structures are allowed for – such as those characterised by inter-sectoral
linkages – the ‘obviousness’ of commonly accepted conclusions may have to be critically
scrutinised.
Many different extensions present themselves. We have not analysed the role of trade
policy and have assumed an exogenous absence of trade barriers. Trade policy analysis could
be carried out to highlight the implications of trade liberalisation. Our model already suggests
that a large welfare state may be compatible with openness and foster specialisation in high-
tech goods. The introduction of an explicit trade policy analysis may help to shed further light
on the empirical regularity (e.g. Rodrik, 1998) of a positive correlation between government
expenditure (of which welfare spending is a high proportion, at least in industrial economies)
and openness to foreign trade. It is also interesting to examine the implications of exposing
factor markets to global competition.
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APPENDIX
A1. Derivation of (18),  
J
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To derive jε , we need to define union j’s labour demand. This is given by ∫
∈
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ij dilL  which
in the symmetric equilibrium can be written as jij lJ
NL = , where jil  denotes employment of
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, yields (18).
A2. Existence and uniqueness of a solution in levels, and derivation of (21).
The model, for a given symmetric long-run equilibrium in the intermediate input industry,
consists of the following equations
( ) 1111 1x PqrP λβα −−= ,           (A2.1)
( ) 1P;PqrP 22x 2122 == −− λβα ,           (A2.2)
wNP 1
1
x
σ−
= ,            (A2.3)
rN)(XPx γσ= , (A2.4)
)XP(1)Zq(Kr x
2112
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2112
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−+
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
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−
−
= λβλβ
βαβα
σλβλβ
λαλα
, (A2.5)
( ) N
w
r1L −= σγ , (A2.6)
( ) ( ) ( )qZrKwL)LL(b φρτ ++=− , (A2.7)
J
1−
−=
σ
σε , (A2.8)
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21 PPP;
)11(
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w , (A2.9 
where: (A2.1) and (A2.2) are from equation (6) with the normalisation P2=1; (A2.3) is
obtained from (4) and (15) in the symmetric equilibrium; (A2.4) is the zero profit condition in
the intermediate input industry in (17); (A2.5) is the overall resource constraint (A3.4)
obtained in A3 below; (A2.6) is the labour requirement equation in (20); (A2.7) is the
government budget constraint; (A2.8) is the labour demand elasticity in (19) which was
derived in A1 above; and (A2.9) and (A2.9 DUHWKHXQLRQZDJHVHWWLQJHTXDWLRQVLQDQG
(18 ZLWKP defined as the Cobb-Douglas price index.
For given values of the exogenous variable (b, J, P1, P2, V~ ) and the parameters (α1,
α2, β1, β2, λ1, λ2, γ, σ), (A2.1)-(A2.9) can, in principle, be solved to determine the values of
the endogenous variables (Px, r, q, N, X, w, L, ε), and one of the tax rates (τ, ρ, φ). To
examine the existence and uniqueness of the solution we note that for any given w equations
(A2.1)-(A2.5) can be solved for (Px, r, q, N, X) and  it is this part of the model that, due to its
nonlinearities in N, could generate problems of existence and uniqueness. We therefore focus
on reducing these equations to one which determines N and then using that equation to derive
a sufficient condition for a unique solution to exist. To do so, first solve (A2.1) and (A2.2) to
obtain
( ) r112 x21 PPPr θββ ∆−= ,           (A2.10)
( ) q112
x21 PPPq
θαα ∆ −−
= ,           (A2.11)
where 
2112
2112
q βαβα
λαλαθ
−
−
= , 
2112
2112
r βαβα
λβλβθ
−
−
=  and ( )2112 βαβα∆ −−= . Note that (A2.10) and
(A2.11) are used to derive (21). Substituting for Px from (A2.3) in these equations implies
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where ( )∆βαβαθθ 11122qr )(2)(1)( PPwc ++−+−= >0. Next, substituting from (A2.4) into (A2.5) and
rearranging using the above expressions for 
r
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


−


+






θσ
γσ
θ
θ
, (A2.13)
which, together with (A2.12), implies
1N11
K
N
K
Zc
r
1
r
q
qr
=



−


+






−
+
θσ
γσ
θ
θ
σ
θθ
. (A2.14)
Although the left-hand-side of (A2.14) is nonlinear in N, Condition 1 specified in the text –
following equation (25) – is sufficient for a unique N to solve the equality in (A2.14). This is
because under that condition 
r
θ >0, qθ >0, and rθ + qθ > σ - 1 which imply the left-hand-side
of (A2.14) to be zero at N=0, to tend to infinity as ∞→N , and to be positive and
monotonically increasing in N.
A3. Derivation of (24),  ( )XˆPˆ)a1(qˆarˆ x +−+= .
Using (7), (9), (10) and noting that d2d1s XXX +=  and NK dx γ= , we obtain the following
three resource constraints:









++=++=
+=+=
+=+=
.NY
r
1Y
r
PKKKK
,Y
r
1Y
q
P
ZZZ
,Y
P
1Y
P
PXXX
s
22
s
1
1
1
d
x
d
2
d
1
s
22
s
1
1
1
d
2
d
1
s
2
x
2
s
1
x
1
1
d
2
d
1
s
γαα
ββ
λλ
  (A3.1)
30
Solving the first two equations for s1Y  and 
s
2Y  yields,
2112
2x2s
11
ZqXP
YP λβλβ
λβ
−
−
= ,  (A3.2)
and
2112
x11s
22
XPZq
YP λβλβ
βλ
−
−
= . (A3.3)
Substituting these into the third equation, and noting from (17) that sx X
r
P1N
σ
γ = , yields the
‘overall’ resource constraint,
)XP(1)Zq(Kr sx
2112
2112
2112
2112 



−
−
−+



−
−
= λβλβ
βαβα
σλβλβ
λαλα
, (A3.4)
which imposes a restriction on the values of the three factors and, regardless of the structure
of factor intensities, should hold for all s1Y  and 
s
2Y . Equation (24) is obtained by totally
differentiating (A3.4) where 






−
−
=
Kr
Zq
a
2112
2112
λβλβ
λαλα
. Note that, given (A3.4), it follows that








−
−
−=−
Kr
XP1
a1
s
x
2112
2112
λβλβ
βαβα
σ
. It is useful to note that a comparison between a, 
r
θ  and
qθ  implies Kr
Zqa
q
r
=
θ
θ
 and 







−=−
Kr
XP11
a1
s
x
r
θσ
 where the latter shows that a<1 iff
r
θσ < .
A4. Derivation of 0
dN
dM
> .
First, substituting from (21) and (24) in (26) we can re-write the latter as,
xqr
qrx Pˆ
M
Zq
M
Kr
a1
a
M
XP
Mˆ 






−


+



−
+


= θθ
θθδ
,
which, using 
Kr
Zqa
q
r
=
θ
θ
 derived in A3 above, can be written as
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xr
qrx Pˆ
M
Kr)a1(
a1
a
M
XP
Mˆ 






−+



−
+


= θ
θθδ
.
Next, substituting from (21) and (23) into (24) we obtain ( ) Nˆa
a1Pˆ
qr
x 



+
−
=
θθ
. As a result, by
ensuring that 0q >θ , 0r >θ  and 0<a<1, Condition 1 is also sufficient for 0dN
dM
> .
A5. Derivation of 0
dN
dY e1 > .
Using the values of supply and demand for good 1 given by equations (A3.2) and (2), we
obtain ( )ZqKrXPZqXPYPYPYP x
2112
2x2d
11
s
11
e
11 ++−
−
−
=−= δµλβλβ
λβ
 which can be rearranged as
equation (27):




−







+
−
−







−
−
=
112112
2
1
x
2112
2e
1 P
Kr
P
Zq
P
XP
Y µµλβλβ
λµδλβλβ
β
,
Totally differentiating this gives
( ) rˆ
P
Krqˆ
P
ZqXˆPˆ
P
XPdY
112112
2
x
1
x
2112
2e
1 



−







+
−
−+







−
−
= µµλβλβ
λµδλβλβ
β
,
which, using equations (21) and (24) and noting that 
Kr
Zqa
q
r
=
θ
θ
, can be rearranged as
xq
12112
2
x
qr
1
x
2112
2e
1 PˆP
Zq
a
a1Pˆ
a1
a
P
XPdY θµλβλβ
λθθµδλβλβ
β







 

 −
−
−
+



−
+








−
−
= .
Given that ( ) Nˆa
a1Pˆ
qr
x 



+
−
=
θθ
, we obtain equation (28):
( ) Nˆa
a1
P
Zq
a
a1
a1
a
P
XPdY
qr
q
12112
2qr
1
x
2112
2e
1 



+
−









 

 −
−
−
+



−
+








−
−
=
θθ
θµ
λβλβ
λθθµδ
λβλβ
β
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Thus, the sufficient conditions for 0
dN
dY e1 > , in addition to Condition 1, are
0
2112
2 >−
−
µδλβλβ
β
 and 0
a
a1
2112
2 >

 −
−
−
µλβλβ
λ
. The former is always satisfied since
01
2112
2 >>>
−
µδλβλβ
β
 holds and the latter simply requires the propensity to consume good
1 from income to be sufficiently small, i.e. ))(a1(
a0
2112
2
λβλβ
λµ
−−
<< , hence Condition 2.
A6. Derivation of (29).
Totally differentiating NIΩ  noting that 
J
1−
−=
σ
σε  yields
0dbdJddw ’NIb
’NI
J
’NI’NI
w =+++ ΩΩτΩΩ τ ,
where
( ) .1;0)1(J
w)1)(1(
;0w)1(;0)1(11 ’NIb2’NIJ’NI’NIw −=>
−−
−−
=<−−=>−


−= Ω
σσ
τσΩτΩτ
ε
Ω τ
A7. Derivation of (30), (31) and (32).
Using (20), the government budget constraint can be re-written as
( ) ( ) 0LbqZrKrN
w
b)1( =−++


+− φρτσγ ,
whose total differentiation yields:
0dbGdGdGdGdwGdrGdqGdNG ’b’’’’w’r’q’n =+++++++ φρτ φρτ
where
.Lw/rN)1(G;ZqG;KrG;rN)1(G
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’
b
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2’
w
’
q
’
r
’
n
−−===−=
−−=
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φρτσγτσγ
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We define dwG
dw
dN
dN
dRG
dN
dqGGdwGdrGdqGdNGdwG ’w
’
r
’
q
’
n
’
w
’
r
’
q
’
n
*’
w 


+


++=+++=
where *’wG  can be evaluated as follows. From (21), and given that ( ) Nˆa
a1Pˆ
qr
x 



+
−
=
θθ
, we
obtain ( ) Nˆa
)a1(
rˆ
qr
r 



+
−
=
θθ
θ
 and ( ) Nˆa
)a1(
qˆ
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q




+
−
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θθ
θ
 which imply ( ) 



+
−
=
Na
r)a1(
dN
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qr
r
θθ
θ
, and
( ) 



+
−
−=
Na
q)a1(
dN
dq
qr
q
θθ
θ
. Equation (25) can be written as ( )
1
qra
a1
1
1
W
N
dw
dN
−




+
−
+
−
=
θθσ
.
These, together with the expressions for the partial derivatives ’nG , 
’
qG , ’rG  and 
’
wG  can be
substituted in the above expression for *’wG to yield:
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( ) ( ) ( )
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qrqr
r
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+
−
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To determine the signs of derivatives in (31), note that the only ambiguous expression is
( ) ( ) ( )

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w
Starting from an initial situation in which Condition 1 holds and ρ = φ, it can be seen that all
terms in { }•  on the right-hand-side are positive since ( ) 0KraKrZqKr rrqr >−=− θθρφθρθ ,
given that 
Kr
Zqa
q
r
=
θ
θ
. Also, given equation (18), V~Pw)1(11b −−


−= τ
ε
, which can be
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used to write the last two terms as 0V~Pw)1(11w11
w
rN)1(
2 >


+−


−−


−

 −
τ
εε
σγ
.
A8. Derivation of (35),  0
dw
dlN
dw
dNl
dw
dL i
i >+=  .
From (20), w/rN)1(L −= σγ  whose total differentiation implies wˆNˆrˆLˆ −+= . Using (21)
and noting that ( ) Nˆa
a1Pˆ
qr
x 



+
−
=
θθ
, this can be rewritten as ( ) wˆNˆ1a
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.
Substituting for Nˆ  from (25) implies ( ) ( ) wˆ1a
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1
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a
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−
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θ
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1
1
a
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a
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−
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−
+
−
−



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+
−
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θ
,
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1
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1
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a
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a
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r
−


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+
−
+
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
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−+



+
−
−
+
−
=
θθσσθθθθ
θ
,
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1
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a
)1)(a1(Lˆ
1
qrqr
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
+
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θθσσθθ
θ
,
the right-hand-side of which is positive as long as σ>2 and Condition 1 holds so that 0<a<1
and 1
r
>θ .
A9. Derivation of (36) and (37).
Totally differentiating IΩ  and noting that 
J
1−
−=
σ
σε  yields  0dJdw ’NIJ
’NI
w =+ ΩΩ ,  where
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